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Abstract
We evaluate the security of human voice password databases from an information
theoretical point of view. More specifically, we provide a theoretical estimation
on the amount of entropy in human voice when processed using the conventional
GMM-UBM technologies and the MFCCs as the acoustic features. The theoretical
estimation gives rise to a methodology for analyzing the security level in a corpus
of human voice. That is, given a database containing speech signals, we provide
a method for estimating the relative entropy (Kullback-Leibler divergence) of the
database thereby establishing the security level of the speaker verification system.
To demonstrate this, we analyze the YOHO database, a corpus of voice samples
collected from 138 speakers and show that the amount of entropy extracted is less
than 14-bits. We also present a practical attack that succeeds in impersonating the
voice of any speaker within the corpus with a 98% success probability with as little
as 9 trials. The attack will still succeed with a rate of 62.50% if 4 attempts are
permitted. Further, based on the same attack rationale, we mount an attack on
the ALIZE speaker verification system. We show through experimentation that the
attacker can impersonate any user in the database of 69 people with about 25%
success rate with only 5 trials. The success rate can achieve more than 50% by
increasing the allowed authentication attempts to 20. Finally, when the practical
attack is cast in terms of an entropy metric, we find that the theoretical entropy
estimate almost perfectly predicts the success rate of the practical attack, giving
further credence to the theoretical model and the associated entropy estimation
technique.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last decade, we have witnessed large scale adoption of biometric technologies,
e.g. fingerprint scanners on laptops, cameras with built-in face recognition capabili-
ties at airport terminals and stadiums, and voice based authentication technologies
for account access on smartphones. Among biometric authentication technologies,
voice based authentication is playing a pivotal role due to the exponential growth
in the smartphone user base [1] and due to the unparalleled convenience it offers.
Indeed, human voice can be easily captured over large distances simply over a stan-
dard phone line without requiring any special reader device. Furthermore, compared
to other biometric schemes voice authentication offers the user a greater degree of
freedom during signal acquisition.
Voice verification comes in two flavors: text dependent and text independent.
Text independent voice verification, i.e. speaker verification, is not concerned with
the text that is spoken. In contrast, in text dependent systems, the verification
requires a match on the spoken text as well as a match on the user. With rapid
developments in mobile computing and voice recognition technologies, it is conve-
nient to use voice verification in the service of biometric authentication. Typically, in
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commercial speaker verification systems, speech recognition is applied before speaker
verification to prevent playback attacks. The user is asked to recite a randomly gen-
erated pass-phrase, and only if what the user says matches the pass-phrase, the
system proceeds to the text-independent voice verification step.
Given the usability and ease of deployment, a number of companies are now offer-
ing voice based authentication services: PerSay’s VocalPassword and FreeSpeech,
Agnitio’s Kivox and VoiceVault’s VoiceSign, VoiceAuth products, etc. Unfortu-
nately, the precise details of the extraction techniques used are not made public. We
can only speculate on connections to academic work developed in the last decade.
During the late 1990s to early 2000s, researchers in [2, 3] introduced the Gaussian
Mixture Model (GMM) and the adapted GMM (GMM-UBM) to the speaker ver-
ification task. Later in [4, 5], the authors propose a new classifier by combining
a support vector machine with a Gaussian Mixture Model verifier. In the mean-
time, researchers in [6, 7, 8] developed Joint Factor Analysis (JFA), a modification
of GMM in order to tackle channel variability. Today, the state-of-the-art I-Vector
method [9] is a derivative of JFA.
With all this deployment of voice authentication technologies, it becomes crucial
to evaluate voice authentication technologies from a security point of view. Specifi-
cally, we are interested in text independent voice authentication. We want to explore
whether or not human voice allows us to build a voice based authentication scheme
whose security matches that of a cryptographic authentication scheme.
Studies in [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] indicate in general that the security level of biomet-
ric features themselves may be low. A number of studies in [15, 16, 17, 18] show that
the speaker verification systems are vulnerable to synthesized speech attacks. All
these attacks assume the attacker has acquired speech samples from target victims.
The attacker builds synthesized speech through some transformation method based
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on the parameters trained from the speech sample of the victim. To counter such
attacks, authors of [19, 20] developed an anti-spoofing system targeting the synthe-
sized speech attack. However, researchers seldom examine the speaker verification
system from the information security point of view. In this work we take an initial
step in that direction.
1.1 Motivation
To examine the security level of text-independent speaker verification systems, the
performance of the current systems need to be reviewed. Two basic parameters are
introduced in terms of evaluating the performance of a speaker verification system:
false negative rate and false positive rate. These two rates represent the probability
of a valid user being rejected by the verification system and probability of a fake user
being accepted by the verification system, respectively. For a specific system one
can always decrease one of these two rates by increasing the other one. The overall
performance can be evaluated by a single parameter called equal error rate (EER).
The EER is reached when the false negative rate equals false positive rate. A lower
EER, in general, is the attribute of a better speaker verification system. Based on
the summary of the performance of current text-independent speaker verification
systems, EER is ranging from 1% to 10% [6, 7, 3]. The 1% false positive rate
means that out of every 100 attempts to carry out voice authentication by random
people one person will succeed. In other words, a person’s account will have a
1% probability of being compromised by a random attacker. Since 1% implies
− log2 (
1
100
) = 6.6 ≈ 7 bits, this corresponds to the security offered by an encryption
algorithm with a key size of about 7 bits. One way to increase the security level
would be to decrease the false positive rate. However, decreasing the false positive
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rate would correspond to a higher false negative rate. Even if we tolerate the very
high noise level that comes with decreasing the false positive rate by a factor of 100
the increase in security would be effectively doubling the key length. That is, going
from around 7 bits to about 14 bits. This logic can be seen as a strong indicator of
the limited amount of entropy that can be extracted from human voice.
The importance of establishing an entropy estimation is the real measure of
identification capacity. To elaborate, in any voice identification system, the per-
son’s voice features will eventually be converted into a model or a key or any other
mathematical representation. The form of which must be known publicly according
to Kerckhoffs’ basic security principles. This representation of the speaker’s voice
features will only be as unpredictable to an attacker as allowed by the entropy of
the voice features. Therefore, if the entropy is low an attacker will simply test every
single instant of the voice representation (which will be small due to the low entropy)
until the attacker finally succeeds in impersonating that speaker. Security cannot
be guaranteed by a complicated extraction process, but instead has to be rooted in
entropy. Establishing the entropy content of a human voice password database in a
way that is meaningful for security applications is the goal of this dissertation. Thus
far – to the best of our knowledge – no rigorous study of the extractable entropy
from human voice has appeared in the literature.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
In this dissertation, we show from both theoretical and practical views that the
entropy of the Voice Password Databases is limited. We estimate the security level
of text-independent speaker verification systems presenting a full fledged information
theoretical analysis. The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.
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In Chapter 2, we overview the related background knowledge of text-independent
voice authentication/verification technologies. We start by reviewing how a typical
voice authentication system works. Next, we explain feature extraction and feature
modeling techniques. We focus on the fundamental text-independent voice verifi-
cation techniques, i.e. we review Mel-Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCC) and
Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM).
In Chapter 3 we explain how we estimate the entropy of a human voice password
database. We start by introducing the concept of entropy in security and enumer-
ating different entropy metrics. Next, we explore the possibility of applying the
differential entropy metric to a human voice password database and point out the
deficiency of using this metric. Eventually, we propose and show by experiments
that relative entropy is an appropriate measurement of uncertainty of the voice pass-
word database. We finally relate the theoretical relative entropy estimation to the
attack introduced in detail in Chapter 4.
In Chapter 4, we propose an attack on a simulated voice authentication system.
We begin with describing the MFCC-GMM based voice authentication system that
we are attacking. We then explain the attack rationale and the detail of the attack.
Finally, we show the experimental results. The successful attack in this chapter is
a support of our theoretical entropy estimation in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 5 we take a further step to attack a third-party open-source text-
independent voice authentication system. We first introduce the target system AL-
IZE. Then we explain the attack rationale. After reviewing why the attack method
in Chapter 4 cannot apply directly to the ALIZE system, we propose an effective
method of building mock speech signals. Next, we apply the proposed attack method
to the YOHO database and show the experiments. Finally, we relate this attack to
the previous attack in Chapter 4.
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In Chapter 6 we relate our work to the state-of-the-art speaker verification sys-
tems. We explain that although we demonstrate our work using the classical GMM-
UBM speaker verification system, the limited entropy which enables our attack on
GMM-UBM is an intrinsic property of the speech signal still present even if JFA or
an I-Vector based system is employed. Meanwhile, we propose possible utilization
of the voice passwords.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we conclude the dissertation.
6
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we briefly review existing voice authentication technologies. In
Section 2.2 we explain short term cepstral analysis and two representative cepstral
features: MFCC and LPCC. In Section 2.3, we introduce Gaussian Mixture Model,
the feature modeling methods targeting text-independent voice authentication tasks.
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2.1 Introduction
Speaker verification systems work in two phases: enrollment and verification [21].
During enrollment, a speaker is asked to contribute speech samples whose features
are then extracted as shown in Figure 2.1. The speech features are then used to
develop the users’ speech models. The speech model is stored for future comparison.
At a later time, when verification is required, see Figure 2.2, fresh samples are
collected from the user. After similar extraction phases, the resulting extracted
features are compared against the model stored during enrollment.
Feature Extracting 
Module
Speech from 
known speaker
Speech 
features Modeling Module
Speech model for
known speaker
Figure 2.1: Speaker enrollment.
Feature Extracting 
Module
Speech from 
unknown speaker
The known 
speaker model Score Decision Module
Accept or
Reject
Speaker Model 
database
Figure 2.2: Speaker verification.
Feature extraction, also known as speech parameterization, is dominated by
the cepstral family. Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) and Linear pre-
dictive coding coefficients (LPCC) are the representative technologies. Feature
modeling methods can be classified as generative approaches and discriminative
approaches based on the training mechanism. The generative approaches capture
within class features, including Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM), Hidden Markov
Models (HMM), Vector Quantization (VQ), and the well known Joint Factor Analy-
sis (JFA). Note that the HMM take into the consideration the temporal sequence of
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the feature therefore widely used in text-dependent speaker verification tasks. Other
techniques do not model temporal information, mainly used for text-independent
speaker verification tasks. The discriminative approaches capture the boundary be-
tween two classes. The representation of discriminative approaches are artificial
neural networks (ANNs) and Support Vector Machines (SVM). Table 2.1 summa-
rizes the popular feature extraction and feature modeling methods [22].
Table 2.1: Summary of tasks in speaker verification.
Feature Extraction Methods Feature Modeling Methods
MFCC, LPCC
Generative approaches Discriminative approaches
Text-
independent
Text-
dependent SVM, ANN
GMM, VQ,
JFA
HMM
2.2 Feature Extraction
The most popular feature extraction technique used in voice verification systems
is based on short term cepstral analysis including MFCC, LPCC, etc [23, 24, 25].
We now briefly review two basic techniques that will be essential to our entropy
estimation and our attack.
2.2.1 Cepstral Analysis
Cepstral analysis [26] is widely used technique today for speech and speaker feature
extraction tasks. A human voice signal s(n) is typically modeled as a convolution
s(n) = e(n) ∗ θ(n) where θ(n) represents the response of the vocal system and the
e(n) represents the excitation. In both speech recognition and speaker recognition
applications the goal is to extract unique features representing the speaker or the
speech. This information is precisely the kind of information that is captured by
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the response of the vocal system θ(n). Consequently, the initial task of any speech
or speaker recognition application becomes the extraction of θ(n). To achieve this
goal, cepstral analysis may be employed. According to [27], the cepstrum of a signal
s(n) is defined as
cs(n) = DFT
−1{log{|DFT(s(n))|}} =
1
2pi
pi∫
−pi
Cs(w)e
jwndw . (2.1)
Here DFT represents the Discrete Fourier Transform, S(ω) denotes the DFT coeffi-
cients of s(n), and the cepstrum is obtained by cs(n) = DFT
−1{log(|S(ω)|)}. Based
on equation 2.1, the steps in computing the cepstrum can be explained as follows:
1. Compute the DFT of the speech signal s(n): by computing the DFT, the
convolution of the vocal system θ(n) and the excitation e(n) turns into a
multiplication, i.e. S(ω) = E(ω) ·Θ(ω).
2. Compute the logarithm of the amplitude of S(ω): by computing the loga-
rithm of S(ω), the multiplication E(ω) · Θ(ω) turns into addition Cs(ω) =
log(|S(ω)|) = log(|E(ω)|) + log(|Θ(ω)|) = Ce(ω) + Cθ(ω).
3. Compute the inverse DFT 1 of the above: this step will effectively take the
signal into a different frequency domain (called quefrency) where the signal
ce(n) representing Ce(ω) in quefrency domain resides at the higher quefrency
part while cθ(n) (the quefrency representation ofCe(ω)) will reside at the lower
quefrency part. This allows us to extract the response of the vocal system.
The steps above highlight a general framework for extracting voice features. In order
to produce more effective results different scaling techniques can be applied to the
1Note that signal Cs(ω) is even, so the DFT is equivalent to the Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) which is adopted in practical implementations.
10
process. In particular, we will be interested in using the cepstrum along with the
Mel-scale filter banks and short term processing. In the next two sections we briefly
explain these techniques.
2.2.2 Short-term Processing
Commonly a speech signal s(n) is not processed as a whole. Instead, signals are
initially divided into a number of overlapping smaller segments each of which is
processed individually. This partitioning of the signal is motivated by the dynamic
variation of the signal which is better captured through the smaller segments.
There are two important concepts in short term processing: frame rate (step) and
window duration. Typically both are expressed in milliseconds. Window duration is
the length of one short term piece. Where as frame rate is the time duration between
the beginning of two windows [28]. Research shows that the quickest movement of
vocal articulators are in the order of 10 ms [27, 29] and therefore is used as the
frame rate. The window duration is commonly 2–3 times the frame rate causing an
overlap of adjacent short term pieces.
2.2.3 Mel-scale & Filter Banks
As mentioned earlier the cepstrum spectrum is typically used along with Mel-scale
filter banks which yields the Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [30]. The
central idea of the Mel (melody) frequency scale is to apply a linear map on the
signal’s frequency components below 1000 Hz and a logarithmic map for frequency
components above 1 kHz. As such, the Mel-scale can be represented using the
11
following equation [31].
Mel(f) = 2595 · log10
(
1 +
f
700
)
,
where f represents the normal frequency components in the range 0 to 4 kHz — the
range of the traditional telephone bandwidth.
It is important to note that the Mel-frequency components are influenced by the
amplitudes of nearby components. This effect forms a critical-band. The critical-
band is constant for about 100 Mels on Mel-scale. Mel filter banks are designed
with the critical-band in mind. The original Mel filter banks are 20 overlapped
filter banks with 10 evenly distributed banks below 1 kHz in Hertz scale and 10
banks with a log distribution covering the range of 1− 4 kHz. To compute the Mel
frequency components, Cs(w) will go through the group of Mel filter banks yielding
Cmels (w), the Mel-frequency version of Cs(w), which will be used in the later steps
of cepstral analysis.
2.2.4 MFCC and LPCC
Mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC) [30, 32] have been shown to outperform
any other Short Term Cepstrum feature extraction technique in speech recognition
and later on widely used in speaker verification tasks. Similar to other cepstral fea-
tures, MFCC is obtained from a speech signal through a combination of transforms
[21, 33, 25]. Particularly, MFCC can be carried out with the following steps.
1. Break the input into a number of time frames to be processed independently.
Each frame is typically 20− 30 ms.
2. Using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) compute the frequency components of
each of the time frames and take the amplitude.
12
Speech 
signal windowing FFT Abs() Filterbank Log() DCT MFCC
Figure 2.3: Transformation from signal to MFCC.
3. Use a number of triangular band-pass filters in order to project the frequency
components of each frame into the Mel-scale.
4. Take the logarithm.
5. Apply a discrete cosine transform (DCT) on the output of the filters in order
to compute the MFCC for each frame.
The output of the above steps will be a matrix C where the entry cij represents
the ith Mel-frequency cepstral coefficient for the jth time frame of the input sound as
shown in Figure 2.3. To remove the channel filter bias and intra-speaker variability,
compensation methods can be applied [21]. Note that MFCC processing is invertible
by inverting each step in the MFCC computation steps. However, because some of
the MFCC processing steps are non-linear, the inversion will be a lossy process. The
inversion details can be found at [34].
The other often used voice feature is Linear Predictive Coding coefficients (LPCC)
[35]. The LPCC is also based on short term processing and cepstral analysis (see
Section 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 for detail). The first two and last steps of LPCC transforma-
tion are exactly the same as MFCC. The rationale behind LPCC is that the voice
signal can be viewed as a group of auto regressive (AR) filters. The LPCC estimates
the parameter of the AR filter for each windowed speech signal. For each windowed
signal, the parameter of the AR filter is estimated by previous parameters. That is
the reason why it is called linear predictive coding.
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From mathematical point of view, MFCC and LPCC are very similar to each
other. They can both be viewed as high dimensional continuous random variables.
We name them as short-term processed cepstral feature (STC) because of their sim-
ilarity in math form. Whenever the STCs are extracted, they are not directly used
as templates for verification task. Instead, they are commonly further compressed
as certain mathematical model. In the next section we will discuss how the voice
feature is modeled.
2.3 Feature Modeling
In voice verification, the extracted feature is not directly used as the voice tem-
plate. Instead, a more compressed probabilistic representation will be generated
based on the voice feature. This process is called feature modeling. We now briefly
review Gaussian mixture model. This approach founds the basis of text-independent
speaker verification algorithms.
2.3.1 The Gaussian Mixture Model
The Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [2] is one of the most widely used voice models
in text-independent speaker verification. Based on the GMM, many other methods
were derived. One of the most popular methods is Joint Factor Analysis (JFA)
[6, 7, 8]. The JFA model tackles the inter-speaker variability problem and therefore
improves the performance of the speaker verification process. The GMM is a uni-
state HMM [36] regardless of temporal information. The GMM is based on the
fact that any probability distribution can be expressed as a collection of weighted
Gaussian distributions with different means and variances [37]. Each Gaussian may
reflect one aspect of features of the human voice. What is interesting about the
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GMM is that the model is trained using unsupervised computer clustering which
means that the individual Gaussian distributions are unlabeled. Therefore, we may
not know which Gaussian distribution captures which features of the human voice.
The GMM is a collection of weighted Gaussian distributions λ which reflects the
real distribution of mass2. A GMM is denoted by λ = {pi, µi,Σi} i = 1, 2, ...N where
pi gives the weight of i
th component. Therefore,
∑
pi = 1. The mean and variance
of the ith component are represented by µi and Σi, respectively. N represents the
number of Gaussian components. The Gaussian Mixture Density is defined as
p(X|λ) =
M∑
i=1
pibi(X) . (2.2)
Where X is a random vector, bi(X) is probability density function of i
th component
explicitly given as
bi(X) =
1√
2pi|Σi|
e−
1
2
(X−µi)
′
Σ−1i (X−µi) .
Given K observations of the random vector X , the probability of X following the
GMM λ can be expressed as
q(X|λ) =
(
K∏
k=1
p(Xk|λ)
) 1
K
(2.3)
where Xk is the k
th observation of X . For a known speaker j, the GMM model λj
is computed such as to maximize the overall probability q(Xj|λj). Therefore, the
GMM λj provides a voice template. In GMM based biometric verification system,
a two phase scenario is applied. In the enrollment phase, a feature Xj extracted
from a person j, is used to generate a template GMM λj. In the verification phase,
2In the voice verification case this corresponds to the cepstral features.
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a decision function
q(X ′|λj)
 ≥ T accept< T reject (2.4)
is computed. Where T is the pre-defined constant threshold and X ′ is a fresh feature
extracted from an unknown person who claims to be j. If the likelihood q(X ′|λj)
is greater than the thresh hold, the unknown person passes the verification as j
otherwise the authorization fails.
Finally, we note that a more popular version of the GMM, namely the Adapted
Gaussian Mixture Model, is in use today [3]. In the Adapted GMM, a univer-
sal background model λb is generated by training with samples collected from all
speakers. Afterwards, each speaker is modeled by adapting the background model.
In the verification phase, the Gaussian mixture density p(x) in Equation 2.2 is sub-
stituted by p′(x) =
p(x|λj)
p(x|λb)
. The details of the adapted GMM modeling algorithm
can be found in [3]. The main advantage of the adapted GMM is that the training
phase for a speaker is much faster while at the same time it gives a more accurate
verification performance. In this dissertation we will base our analysis on the more
popular adapted GMM.
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Chapter 3
Entropy Estimation
In this chapter, we estimate the entropy of a human voice password database as-
suming a voice authentication technology that uses MFCC features and a GMM.
In Section 3.2 and 3.3 we first explain the relationship between entropy and secu-
rity and introduce some basic concepts of entropy. In Section 3.4, we explore the
estimation of differential entropy on STC and point out the problem of using this
entropy metric. In Section 3.5 we propose an entropy estimation on STC using the
relative entropy and show the relative entropy is an good measurement of entropy
bits of the voice features. In Section 3.6, we show experimental results. Finally in
Section 3.7, we connect the entropy estimation to the attack in Chapter 4.
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3.1 Introduction
Entropy is a measurement of uncertainty of a random variable. The importance
of establishing an entropy estimation is the real measure of identification capacity.
Security cannot be guaranteed by a complicated extraction process, but instead has
to be rooted in entropy. Establishing the entropy content of a human voice password
database is crucial in estimating the achievable secure level of a voice authentication
system.
In this chapter we develop an estimation on the relative entropy between users’
voices from human voice password database using the Short Term Cepstrum fea-
tures. By understanding the relative entropy between humans’ voices using a certain
verification technique we are essentially achieving two goals:
1. We place an approximation on the number of people who can be uniquely
identified using the studied verification technique.
2. We place an approximation on the computational effort required to break the
identification technique. That is, we capture the amount of effort needed to
mimic someone else’s voice without previous knowledge of that person’s voice
characteristics.
Under this view we can start evaluating various voice identification software and
technologies in a way that takes into account the most important of all factors, i.e.
security. Further, in this chapter we derive a technique and then use it to estimate
the entropy extracted from the YOHO voice verification corpus [40].
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3.2 Entropy and Security
The entropy [41] of a discrete random variable X is defined as
H(X) = E
[
1
logP (X)
]
=
∑
X∈χ
P (X) logP (X) (3.1)
where P (X) is the probability density function of the r.v. X . It is a measurement
of information bits, i.e. a quantity measurement of the minimum number of yes/no
questions one needs to ask to determine the value of X . The entropy of the English
alphabet, for example, is 4.7 bits assuming the frequency of appearance of each letter
is equal (see Example 1). This means given a letter, at least 4.7 binary questions
need to be asked in order to successfully guess the letter. In other words, one needs
to make a guess among all 24.7 = 26 possibilities to obtain the right letter. In
reality, however, the frequency of letters is not uniform as it is a commonsense that
the letter “e” has the highest frequency while the “z” has the lowest frequency in
the daily usage of the English language. If the frequency of letter usage has been
taken into consideration, the entropy of the English alphabet is only 4.14 bits [42].
That is to say, one needs less effort to successfully guess a letter randomly picked
from an English article than to guess a letter randomly picked from the alphabet
set.
Example 1. Let α = {a, b, c, . . . , z} be the alphabet of English. Assume the fre-
quency of each letter is equal, then the entropy of α is
H(α) =
26∑
i=1
1
26
log
1
26
= 4.7 bits
The concept of entropy highly relates to the security level of cryptographic au-
thentication systems. The entropy of a cryptographic key indicates the expected
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number of trials that an attacker needs in order to successfully guess the key. To
make the concept clear, we review Example 1. Assume a key generation system
produces a key with a single letter picked from the English alphabet, then an at-
tacker may obtain that key with 24.7−1 trials on average using brute-force attack.
The probability that the attacker successfully guesses the key with one attempt is
pr =
1
24.7
= 1
26
. Now assume the attacker is memory-less, i.e. he may re-pick the
same key in his attempts, with N attempts the attacker has P = 1 − (1 − pr)
N
success rate in guessing the key. The attacker will have more than 50% success rate
to get the correct key with 18 trials. If the authentication system picks the letter
randomly from an English book, i.e. the frequency of letter usage is taken into
consideration, the attacker is expected to obtain the key with only 24.14−1 trials.
The connection between entropy and security is also valid in voice authentication
systems. Remember that the voice feature can be viewed as the high dimensional
random variable (see Section 2.2.4 for detail). The entropy of the voice feature
predicts the effort that an attacker needs to reproduce a victim’s voice feature.
3.3 Shannon Entropy, Differential Entropy and
Relative Entropy
The entropy in the form of Equation 3.1 is also known as Shannon entropy which
measures the quantity of expected information bits of a random variable. The
limitation of Shannon entropy is that it only applies to the discrete random variable.
To extend the Shannon entropy to continuous form, the differential entropy
(continuous entropy) is introduced. The differential entropy h(X) of a continuous
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random variable X is defined as
h(X) = −
∫
S
f(x) log f(x)dx (3.2)
where f(x) and S are the probability density function and the support set of the
r.v. X, respectively [41]. However, the differential entropy is quite different from the
Shannon entropy in terms of its properties. For instance, the differential entropy
can be negative while the Shannon entropy can not. A more important difference is
the differential entropy is not a quantity measurement of expected information bits
as Shannon entropy is. Instead, the differential entropy reflects the compactness
of a random variable in distribution, i.e. a small value of the differential entropy
means the random variable is confined to a small area of distribution, while a large
value of the dfferential entropy indicates the random variable are more spread in
the distribution. The differential entropy relates to Shannon entropy through the
quantization of a random variable [41]. Suppose the range of a continuous r.v. X
is divided into n bins. Each bin has a length of ∆ = 2−n. The quantized random
variable X∆ is defined as
X∆ = xi when∆i ≤ X < ∆(i+ 1) (3.3)
where xi is the expected value of i
th bin of the r.v. X. The entropy of the discrete
r.v. X∆ which is the quantized version of the r.v. X should be
H(X∆) = −
∑
∆f(xi) log f(xi)− log∆ (3.4)
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As the ∆→ 0,
H(X∆) + log∆ → h(X) (3.5)
H(X∆)− n → h(X) (3.6)
The other form of entropy metric is relative entropy a.k.a. Kullback-Leibler
divergence. Relative entropy between two probability mass functions p(x) and q(x),
is defined as
D(p||q) = Ep log
p(x)
q(x)
(3.7)
=
∑
x∈χ
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(3.8)
Similarly, the relative entropy in continuous case is in the form of
D(p||q) =
∫
p(x) log
p(x)
q(x)
(3.9)
where the p(x) and q(x) are now probability density functions [41]. The relative
entropy is a counting measure similar to Shannon entropy, therefore it measures the
information in bits. On the other hand, unlike Shannon entropy/differential entropy,
the properties of relative entropy are the same in both discrete and continuous cases.
The relative entropy is conceptually known as a measurement of the “distance”
between two distributions of random variables. Note that the relative entropy is not
a symmetric metric, i.e. D(p||q) is not commonly equal to D(q||p). According to
[41], the relative entropy measures the inefficiency using distribution q to describe
the real distribution p.
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3.4 Exploration of Differential Entropy on STC
Since the voice feature STC is continuous random variable, we first explore the
possibility of applying differential entropy to the voice feature.
Proposition 1. Let STC(S) ∈ RQ×L be a matrix of L Q-dimensional STC vectors
of a speech signal S representing the concatenation of all speech signals in a database
D, and let σj be the standard deviation of the j
th row of STC(S), then
h (STC(S)) ≤
1
2
Q∑
j=1
log2(2pieσ
2
j ) , (3.10)
where h (STC(S)) is the differential entropy of STC(S).
Proof. Let the Cj be the j
th row of STC(S), then
h (STC(S)) = h(C1, C2, . . . CQ) ≤
Q∑
j=1
h(Cj) , (3.11)
where the equality holds if and only if the C1, C2, . . . CQ are independent. Ac-
cording to [41] the differential entropy of any random vector X with E(X) = µ
and V ar(X) = σ2 is upper bounded by the entropy of the Gaussian distribution
N(µ, σ2). As such, we can upper bound h (STC(S)). First we write
h(Cj) ≤ h(N(µj , σ
2
j )) , (3.12)
where µj and σ
2
j represent the mean and variance of Cj . We now combine Equations
3.11 and 3.12 to upper bound h (STC(S)) as
h (STC(S)) ≤
Q∑
j=1
h(N(µj , σ
2
j )) =
1
2
Q∑
j=1
log2(2pieσ
2
j ) . (3.13)
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Equation 3.13 gives a loose upper bound on the differential entropy of the STC
features. We next discuss the possibility of deducing more rigorous bounds. To
do this, we analyze the source of entropy inside STC features. There are 3 main
sources of entropy which contribute to the total entropy found in STC(S); the text-
independent voice entropy h(V ), the entropy in the spoken words h(W ) and noise.
The entropy added by the noise is useless from a security point of view. However, for
a general bound we assume the noise is a part of h(V ). Note that this assumption
can only increase h(V ) and therefore will not effect the validity of our bound. Based
on this we can write
h(STC(S)) = h(V,W ) .
Our goal is to upper bound h(V ) which according to the joint entropy definition can
be written as
h(V ) = h(V,W )− h(W |V ) . (3.14)
h(V ) is the text-independent entropy that is solely contributed by the speaker’s
voice, h(W |V ) is the entropy of the said words given a specific speaker and h(V,W )
is the total entropy in the speech signal. The upper bound on h(V ) can be com-
puted using hu(V,W ) the upper bound of h(V,W ) and hl(W |V ) the lower bound of
h(W |V ). That is,
h(V ) ≤ hu(V,W )− hl(W |V ) . (3.15)
Upper-bounding h(V,W ) is equivalent to upper-bounding h(STC(S)). Accord-
ing to Equation 3.13, we can upper bound the entropy in h(V,W )
h(V,W ) ≤
1
2
Q∑
j=1
log2(2pieσ
2
j ) = hu(V,W ) , (3.16)
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Next, we compute a lower bound on h(W |V ). By definition (see [41]),
h(W |V ) =
M∑
i=1
p(Vi)h(W |Vi) .
Since we are restricting ourselves to voice signals after being processed by STC,
h(W |Vi) will be h(STCi). That is, the entropy in the speech of speaker i. p(Vi) is
the probability that speaker i is selected from the database of speakers. With M
speakers in the database all equally likely to be chosen we have p(Vi) = 1/M . So
we can simplify the equation of h(W |V ) as
h(W |V ) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
h(W |Vi) =
1
M
M∑
i=1
h(STCi) . (3.17)
To compute a lower bound on h(W |V ) we resort to GMM. The Gaussian mixture
model is a probabilistic technique for modeling an arbitrary random vector. As
the number of components in the GMM λ increases it produces a more accurate
approximation of the distribution X from which an arbitrary random vector X is
drawn. In fact, given a sufficient number of components a GMM can approximate
any smooth function to arbitrary accuracy [43]. Therefore, with sufficiently many
components in λ one can approximate the entropy of X by using the entropy of λ,
that is h(X ) ≈ h(λ). We now borrow the following proposition from [37].
Proposition 2. ([37]) Given a set of random vectors Xi ∈ R
Q from some distribu-
tion X and modeled by a GMM λ = {wi, µi,Σi} where i = 1, 2, ...N , a lower bound
on the entropy of λ can be written as
hl(λ) = −
N∑
i=1
wi · log2
(
N∑
j=1
wj · zi,j
)
, (3.18)
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where
zi,j = N(µi;µj,Σi + Σj) =
1√
2pi|Σi + Σj |
e−
1
2
(µi−µj)
′
(Σi+Σj)−1(µi−µj) .
According to [43], as N goes to infinity, λ tends to describe X which is the true
distribution of X . With that we state the following corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1.
h(X ) = lim
N→∞
h(λ) ≥ lim
N→∞
hl(λ) , (3.19)
where h(·) is the differential entropy.
Now let λi be a GMM for STCi then according to Corollary 1 we have
h(STCi) = lim
N→∞
h(λi)
where N denotes the number of Gaussian components. Using Proposition 2 and
Equation 3.17 we have
h(W |V ) ≥ 1
M
∑M
i=1 limN→∞ hl(λi) = hl(W |V ) . (3.20)
Finally, using Equations 3.15, 3.16 and 3.20 we get
h(V ) ≤
1
2
Q∑
j=1
log2(2pieσ
2
j )−
1
M
M∑
i=1
lim
N→∞
hl(λi) (3.21)
Equation 3.21 gives the upperbound of differential entropy. As we discussed
in Section 3.3, the differential entropy is not directly a quantity measurement of
information in bits. To convert the differential entropy to Shannon entropy, we have
to apply Equation 3.6. Therefore, we apply Equation 3.6 to Equation 3.16, 3.20 and
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3.21 to get
H (V,W ) ≤
1
2
Q∑
j=1
log2(2pieσ
2
j ) + c1n (3.22)
H(W |V ) ≥
1
M
M∑
i=1
lim
N→∞
hl(λi) + c2n (3.23)
H(V ) ≤
1
2
Q∑
j=1
log2(2pieσ
2
j )−
1
M
M∑
i=1
lim
N→∞
hl(λi) + (c1 − c2)n (3.24)
where n is quantization bit while c1 and c2 are two constant.
In this section we developed an upperbound of differential entropy of voice fea-
tures. However, we have no idea of the relation of c1 and c2. Unless c1 equals c2
the bound on H(V ) will not be constant. For instance, if c1 > c2 then H(V ) is
in a form of a constant plus n bit. By increasing n, we can increase the extracted
entropy. With the presented analysis and following brief discussion we can see the
difficulty in estimating information bits in human voice through differential entropy.
This motivated us to consider another entropy metric, i.e. relative entropy, which
will be discussed in the following section.
3.5 Relative Entropy on STC
Our goal in this section is to introduce relative entropy as an measurement of un-
certainty of the STC voice features. Several estimation methods and bounds are
discussed in Section 3.5.2. Relative entropy is useful for measuring the security ob-
tained from using human voice identification on a given database of speech samples.
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3.5.1 Relative entropy estimation of voice features
Since voice features are continuous1, the classic entropy (the Shannon entropy) [41]
which measures the uncertainty of a discrete random variable does not apply directly.
Differential entropy once appeared to be the more appropriate metric. Based on
the discussion in the previous section, it is not. The reason is differential entropy
does not inherit many properties of entropy in the discrete case and therefore does
not reflect the accurate number of bits that is necessary to represent an individual’s
voice. More importantly, the security of voice passwords is not rooted in the absolute
entropy of voice itself. Instead, it is rooted in the “distance” between the different
people’s voice signals.
To overcome these obstacles, we make use of the notion of relative entropy.
Relative entropy is defined by Equation 3.7 and 3.9 Unlike entropy which has two
different forms in case of discrete and continuous, relative entropy maintains the
same form from discrete to continuous case. In [44], relative entropy is used to
represent a measurement of biometric information i.e. how close two biometric
features are. Now, we use relative entropy to measure entropy residing in voice.
Assume Vi(X) and Vj(X) refers to GMM of voice from person i and j, the relative
entropy
DKL(Vi||Vj) = EVi(x)
[
log(
Vi(x)
Vj(x)
)
]
(3.25)
measures how many additional bits one would need to express Vi given an expression
for Vj. The measurement of relative entropy is essential to estimate the security
level of voice authentication systems. It estimates the effort that an attacker need
to successfully impersonate an arbitrary victims i.e. the relative entropy indicates
how many attempts the attacker needs to make in order to modify his own voice
1Note that state-of-the-art text-independent speaker authentication uses a continuous proba-
bility density function GMM to model voice
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feature to be the victim’s voice feature.
3.5.2 Estimation of Relative Entropy for two GMMs
There is no closed form expression that allows us to compute the relative entropy
for two given GMMs. However, several estimation methods can be applied. As
mentioned in [45], assume two GMMs λ(x) and λ′(x), an accurate estimation of
DKL(λ||λ
′) can be obtained by Monte Carlo Sampling:
1. Draw from λ i.i.d. samples {xi}
n
i=1.
2. Compute DMC(λ||λ
′) = 1
n
∑n
i=1 log
(
λ(xi)
λ′(xi)
)
.
Note that as n goes to infinity, DMC converges to DKL(λ||λ
′). The weakness of
Monte Carlo Sampling is the high complexity of computation. In practice, it is
more convenient to use a bound over an estimation procedure. Here we borrow the
following proposition from [45].
Proposition 3 (Relative Entropy Upper Bound [45]). An upper bound on relative
entropy between two GMMs λ(x) and λ′(x) is given as
DKL(λ||λ
′) ≤
∑
i,j
pip
′
jDKL(N(µi,Σi)||N(µ
′
i,Σ
′
i))) = Du1(λ||λ
′) . (3.26)
Alternatively, if two GMMs have same number of components n, the upper bounded
can also be expressed as
DKL(λ||λ
′) ≤ DKL(p||p
′) +
n∑
i
piDKL(N(µi,Σi)||N(µ
′
i,Σ
′
i))
=
n∑
i
pi(log(
pi
p′i
) +DKL(N(µi,Σi)||N(µ
′
i,Σ
′
i)))
= Du2(λ||λ
′) (3.27)
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where λ = {pi, µi,Σi}
n
i=1 and λ
′ = {p′i, µ
′
i,Σ
′
i}
n
i=1.
We next demonstrate the application of these estimates on a real voice database.
3.6 Experiments & Results
In this section we will utilize the relative entropy estimation explained in Section
3.5 to estimate the entropy available to a speaker verification system. Our focus
will be on speaker verification systems that use the MFCC extraction technique
along with GMM modeling. The voice samples that we use for our experiments are
collected from the YOHO database which contains 138 speakers, with each speaker
reciting a random combination of three two digit numbers. We will start this section
by explaining our choice of parameters for the speaker verification system that we
analyze.
3.6.1 Parameter Selection
In the system that we analyze, the voice signal is first broken into a number of
overlapped 10 ms frames which gives the highest time resolution [27, 29]. Each
frame then goes through a hamming window of length 32 ms. Each frame will then
produce a 26 dimensional MFCC vector. The first 13 features except 0th dimension
are kept as the MFCC features and the rest are discarded. Although the optimal
number of filter banks is an open question, typically, the number of filters ranging
from 20 to 32 is suggested for frequencies ranging from 0 to 4 kHz [25, 46]. The
dimension of the MFCC coefficients should be smaller than the number of filters i.e.
the high dimensions are discarded [21]. According to [47], 12 coefficient is sufficient
for speaker recognition. The 12-coefficients MFCC setup is used in [48, 49]. Also
note that the first and second derivatives of the MFCC features are sometimes
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concatenated as the last dimension to the features in order to increase the entropy.
However, experiments [47] have shown that dynamic (derivative) features contribute
far less to the speaker verification performance than normal features. Furthermore,
research in [50] have shown that adding dynamic features contributes very little to
the overall identification performance. Therefore, our speaker verification module
includes only standard MFCC features. Now, based on the 13 dimensional MFCC
features, a 256 component adapted GMM is trained as outlined in [3] which can be
summarized as follows
1. A 256 component universal background model λb is trained
2. For each person i, the GMM λi is trained by adapting the mean vector of λb.
Conceptually, the precision of the GMM can be improved by using more com-
ponents. However, increasing the number of components beyond a certain point
increases the computational cost without yielding any significant benefit in the pre-
cision. Therefore, we fix the number of Gaussian components to 256 which gives
a very good approximation of the original signal [3]. Since the YOHO dataset is
only constrained to voice samples reading digits, 256 GMM should be sufficient to
accurately estimate both the background model and the speaker model [21].
Note that we only adapt the mean of the background model which is what is
suggested in [3]. Also note that the covariance matrices in the background model
can be either full or diagonal. Although the full matrices will do a little better than
the diagonal matrices in terms of recognition they require more computation time.
Based on our database, the verification performance yield an EER of 1.12% and
1.42% using the full and the diagonal covariance matrices, respectively.
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3.6.2 Entropy Upper Bound
We now proceed to estimate the relative entropy bound using Equation 3.27. We
introduce two quantities: Du2(λi||λb) which reflects the expected upper bound on
entropy in bits found in λi, given λb. The second quantity is Du2(λi||λj) which
reflects the expected upper bound on entropy in bits found in λi, given λj. Recall
that λi and λb represent the GMM of the i
th person and the GMM of the background,
respectively. In order to get a good understanding of these numbers we define the
averages over all people in the database. We define Db as the average of Du2(λi||λb)
over all speakers which can be computed as
Db =
N∑
i=1
p(λi)Du2(λi||λb) .
We also define D¯ which is the average of Du2(λi||λj) over all (i, j) combinations
which can be computed as
D¯ =
N∑
j=1
p(λj)
N∑
i=1
p(λi)Du2(λi||λj) .
The value Db is the average upper bound on relative entropy between the peo-
ple and the background which reflects the amount of information the background
reveals about the people. On the other hand, D¯ is the average upper bound on
relative entropy between any two people in the database which reflects the amount
of information that the model of one person yields about another person’s model.
Table 3.1 shows the results for Db and D¯ when using a diagonal and a full covariance
matrix in the model. Figure 3.1 shows the value of Du2(λi||λb) for various values of
i as well as Di =
∑N
j=1 p(λj)Du2(λj||λi).
The results in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 suggest that there is no more than 14
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Full Variance Diagonal Variance
Db 7.23 8.07
D¯ 12.54 13.95
Table 3.1: Upper bound of Relative Entropy in the YOHO voice database.
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Figure 3.1: Averaged relative entropy bounds Du2 for each person in the YOHO
database.
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bits of entropy that separates one person’s GMM from another. This suggests that
an attacker with access to his GMM in a database can impersonate another person
in the database with less than 214 authentication attempts on average. Note here
that a speaker typically will not have access to his GMM in a database. Therefore
such a bound might not immediately have any practical implications. However, the
low amount of entropy does suggest that an attack might exist to compromise the
use of human voice for authentication. Next we explore this possibility.
For an attacker to mount an attack, the first question that should be asked is
“How much information will his voice model without background adaptation (de-
noted λ̂) yield about anyone else’s voice model?” This question is relevant because
without background adaption the attacker can attempt to manipulate his voice di-
rectly in order to attack a database of speakers.
To understand this relation, we let the attacker model his voice with a single
Gaussian N(µ̂, σ̂), where µ̂ and σ̂ are the mean and variance of the attacker’s own
voice features. Now with this model we can estimate the Du1(λi||N(µ̂, σ̂)) by Equa-
tion 3.26. The result is shown in Figure 3.2.
This result indicates that the distance between the voice model built by the
attacker and the voice models in the system is no more than 11 bits. In the next
section, we will show that λ̂ can be even made more closer to λi by increasing the
number of components that is used to generate λ̂.
Figure 3.2 suggests that an attacker can manipulate his voice in order to im-
personate someone else in a database in less than 211 tries on average. Of course
these results hint the existence of an attack but do not expose an attack algorithm.
Also note that so far we have been looking at the upper bound. In the next section
we will re-visit the relative entropy estimates before we relate the quantities to an
actual attack.
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Figure 3.2: Du1(λi||N(µ̂j, σ̂j)) for 10 selected js. Here j = 1, 2, . . . , 10. Each color
represents a j value.
3.6.3 Empirical Results on Monte Carlo Sampling Method
From the estimation above, we know the upper bound of relative entropy in voice.
Now, we use Monte Carlo Sampling to derive a more accurate estimate. Assume
MFCCi = {cci,j}
n
j=1 is the collection of MFCC features for the i
th person in a voice
database, where cci,j represents the features of the j
th time frame. Then
DMC(λi||λ̂) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
log
(
λi(cci,j)
λ̂(cci,j)
)
.
Recall that λ̂ is the voice model built by the attacker i.e. the GMM without back-
ground adaptation. Also note that this is a generous estimation since Monte Carlo
Sampling assumes i.i.d. samples. For the YOHO database, n is around 30, 000 which
is large enough to yield a decent estimation [45]. To simplify the computation, we
pick a single random speaker from the 138 that are in the YOHO database to act as
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DMC(λvictim || λattacker)
Figure 3.3: Monte Carlo Estimation of relative entropy. The dot line shows the
average of 138 victims versus one designated attacker while the solid lines show 10
randomly picked victims versus the attacker.
the attacker. The attacker varies the number of components that he uses to build
GMM from 1 to 10. The experiment results can be found in Figure 3.3. We can see
that the relative entropy is about 5 to 6 bits on average. Meanwhile as the number
of components increases, the relative entropy decreases a little.
3.7 From Entropy Estimates to a Practical Attack
Relative Entropy is a measure of the amount of information that one distribution
reveals about another. Low relative entropy is indicative of security weakness in
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an authentication system. Although the multi-dimensional MFCC vectors appear
to have high degree of freedom, the results we have shown so far indicate that it
should be easy for an attacker to impersonate another user’s voice in the same
database. The results shared in the previous section suggests the existence of an
attack that would allow an attacker to run an impersonation attack with an average
of about 32 to 64 authentication attempts. Indeed, the authors of this dissertation
have successfully demonstrated such attack in [51]. Here we review the attack and
expose the connections between the attack in [51] and the results of the previous
section. More detail of the attack will be explained in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
The attack targets a voice identification system that uses adapted GMM to
model basic MFCC features of speakers. Moreover, the attack assumes processing
parameters identical to what is outlined in this dissertation.
A successful attack signal needs to pass the speaker verification and the speech
recognition processes. To produce such a signal we create two attack signals each
of which targets one of these two modules. These two attack signals will be merged
later, in order to produce the final attack signal which we will refer to as the hybrid
signal.
The first attack signal will target the speech recognition module. Creating this
signal will amount to speech synthesis and therefore will be straightforward. The
attacker may simply use his/her own voice to speak the challenge words provided for
verification. As we discussed earlier, these signals are used to ensure the freshness
of the audio signal that is fed to the system. We refer to this signal as S1.
The second attack signal requires constructing a speech signal with impulse
functions centered at the average of each MFCC feature. More specifically, the
attacker analyzes a large amount of his voice signals and then transforms his voice
into a number of MFCC features. The attacker can then model his features using
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% of passing people
# of Gaussian components in GMM (n)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
m
o
ck
si
gn
al
ra
ti
o
(q
) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.41 6.62 6.62 6.62 5.88 5.88
2 0.00 0.74 0.74 9.56 25.74 29.41 32.35 39.71 52.94 55.15
3 0.00 1.47 11.76 26.47 40.44 45.59 52.21 59.56 55.15 55.15
4 0.00 4.41 19.12 41.18 47.79 60.29 63.97 72.79 74.26 77.94
5 0.00 8.09 29.41 55.15 56.62 70.59 72.06 80.88 88.24 90.44
6 0.00 5.88 34.56 58.82 64.71 75.74 77.94 90.44 93.38 94.12
7 2.21 11.03 45.59 62.50 71.32 77.94 82.35 91.91 94.12 95.59
8 1.47 12.50 43.38 62.50 70.59 80.15 86.76 92.65 98.53 97.79
Table 3.2: Success rate of attack with various parameters.
a few component GMM (in this attack we use 9-component GMM). The attacker’s
GMM will contain a number of means (in our case 9). Now the attacker will create a
sound signal which corresponds to an impulse function centered at one of the GMM
means by inverting the GMM model for MFCC features [34]. The impulse function
will correspond to a voice signal where every time frame gives rise to the same exact
MFCC value (the value of the chosen mean). This means that the attacker will
have several candidates for the attack signal one corresponding to every mean in
the GMM. We refer to these signals as Si2 where i ∈ [1, . . . , n] and n represents the
number of components in the GMM model.
In the last step of the attack we merge the two attack signals to create the final
hybrid signal. There are a number of strategies to merge the signals. Our results
show that the most successful method is a simple concatenation. This means that
the hybrid signal will consist of the first attack signal followed immediately with the
second attack signal. There is a degree of freedom here, i.e. the duration of the two
signals relative to each other. In the next section we will show that the best results
where achieved when the second attack signal was several times the size of the first
attack signal. We refer to the hybrid signal as Hi = [S1|S
i
2]. Note that the first
attack signal needs to be computed in real time due to the challenge. However, the
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DMC(λvictim || λattacker). Averaged on 138 victims
The Shannon entropy indicated by the attack when q=8
The Shannon entropy indicated by the attack when q=1
Figure 3.4: Relation between Relative entropy and attack. Note that when q = 1,
the Shannon entropy goes to infinity in case of n = 1, 2, 3, 4.
second attack signal can be precomputed.
Table 3.2 shows the success rate of the attack with different parameter. Here the
q parameter represents the ratio of the length of the mock signal Si2 to the speech
signal S1. The variable n denotes the number of components in the attacker’s GMM.
The larger the q parameter is, the more dominant the mock signal part is. From an
authentication protocol perspective, the parameter n determines the max number
of trials the attacker is allowed to make before triggering an authentication failure.
Note that an attacker can succeed with a very high probability (> 98%) in as little
as 9 trials.
To relate success rates of this attack to the relative entropy, we convert the
success rates in Table 3.2 into bits measured using Shannon entropy. To do this
we model each attack as a series of n independent repeated Bernoulli experiments.
As shown in Table 3.2, n represents the number of GMM components, while p
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represents the success rate by up to n trials. The outcome of each trial therefore
can be captured by a Bernoulli probability distribution (r, 1− r) where
r =
(
1− (1− p)
1
n
)
,
resulting in a Shannon entropy of − log r. Figure 3.4 shows a simple comparison
between relative entropy estimation DMC and Shannon entropy estimates applied
to the Bernoulli distributions. We focus on q = 1 (least successful attack) and q = 8
(most successful attack) where the mock signal is least and most dominant respec-
tively. It should be clear that the entropy estimates obtained from a real attack
correlates with the entropy estimate derived in the previous section as illustrated
by Figure 3.4.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we took a first step towards evaluating voice password databases
from a security perspective. We defined an authentication model that captures what
is nowadays used in many voice password products. Furthermore, we developed a
theoretical framework based on the notion of relative entropy in order to estimate
the entropy of a voice database. Using the derived entropy estimates we were able
to estimate the security level offered by a voice authentication system relying on a
voice database. Our experimental results are strictly based on voice authentication
systems that use short term cepstrum for feature extraction. However, it remains as
an open question whether it might be possible to extend similar results to other types
of feature extraction techniques. Finally, in order to verify our security estimates,
we carried out a number of experiments using the YOHO voice database. We first
estimated that for the 138 speakers in the database only 14 bits of entropy could
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be extracted. As a confirmation to this result, we outlined a practical attack that
succeeded in impersonating any of the 138 people in the database with as little as
9 tries and a success probability of 0.98.
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Chapter 4
Attack on Simulated Voice
Authentication System
In this chapter, we develop an attack on a simulated voice authentication system.
We will start by describing the type of system that we are attacking in Section
4.2 and then explain the rationale behind the attack in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4
we describe the attack in detail and outline its limitations. Finally, we show the
experimental result of the attack in Section 4.5.
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4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we demonstrate an attack on basic voice authentication technologies.
Specifically, we show how one member of a voice database can manipulate his voice
in order to gain access to resources by impersonating another member in the same
database. The attack targets a voice authentication system built around parallel and
independent speech recognition and speaker verification modules and assumes that
adapted Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) is used to model basic Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCC) features of speakers. We experimentally verify our
attack using the YOHO database. The experiments conclude that in a database of
138 users, an attacker can impersonate anyone in the database with a 98% success
probability after at most nine authorization attempts. The attack still succeeds,
albeit at lower success rates, if fewer attempts are permitted. The attack is very
simple to carryout and opens the door for many varients which can prove quite
effective in targeting voice authentication technologies. The attack also highlights
the limited amount of entropy that can be extracted from the human voice when
using MFCC features.
4.2 Voice Authentication Assumptions
In the following, we list the assumptions we make on the targeted voice authentica-
tion system.
Assumption 1: Parallel Processing In the previous sections we explained that
typical voice authentication systems will randomly chose a number or words
and prompt the user to utter the chosen words in order to prevent replay
attacks. Once the system captures the voice, it will proceed by running two
parallel tasks:
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1. A speech recognition process to insure that the speech signal corresponds
to the randomly chosen text confirming freshness.
2. A speaker verification process to ensure the identity of the speaker.
In our attack we will assume that these two processes, speech and speaker
verification, are applied in parallel. That is to say that the system will process
the speech signal through a speech recognition module and a speaker verifi-
cation module independently and simultaneously and will only authorize the
speaker if both modules return a positive result.
Assumption 2: Basic MFCC and GMM As discussed in Section 2, the basic
idea of speaker verification relies on extracting MFCC features and modeling
them using a GMM. Many variants of the standard MFCC and GMM model
are utilized today. For a general result we assume that the attacked system will
have a speaker verification module which utilizes a standard MFCC feature
extraction step followed by a standard GMM modeling step.
4.3 Attack Rationale
The strategy we follow in our attack is to synthesize a rogue speech signal that
will satisfy the speaker verification module without degrading the performance of
the speech recognition process too much. Since it is the center piece of our at-
tack, we briefly review (in informal terms) the speaker verification process. In the
enrollment step, a person’s voice is modeled as a probability distribution over the
MFCC features. The features are extracted from captured voice samples. In the
speaker verification step newly captured voice samples are processed, and the result-
ing features are placed into the model yielding an aggregate metric that captures the
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likelihood of the features extracted from the new sample coming from the same per-
son. With more voice samples, the model becomes more accurate, in turn improving
the accuracy of the likelihood predictions.
In order to capture this probability distribution a GMM model is built. Before
elaborating on the attack rationale we make two observations:
1. As explained earlier a GMM model contains a number of Gaussian distribu-
tions which are trained by varying its mean, variance and weight. According
to [3] the best results are achieved when GMMs are assigned fixed variances
and weights and are trained by only moving around the means of the Gaus-
sian. Essentially, the means of the Gaussians in a GMM model will capture
the peaks of the modeled feature distribution.
2. In general, GMMs behave in a manner similar to any other basis system where
adding more GMM components will result in a more accurate model of the
distribution. This suggests that maximizing the number of components in the
GMM will yield significantly better results. This hypothesis was investigated
in [3] where the authors found that the equal false positive and false negative
rates saw very little improvement beyond 256 components. Another important
results of [3] is that increasing the number of components from 16 to 2048
improved the equal false positive and false negative rate from 20% to 10%.
This means that 80% of the speakers were properly identified using a mere 16
component GMM. In essence, the general shape of the probability distribution
of MFCC features will be captured with a small number of GMM components.
These observation lead us to the following hypothesis:
Given a probability distribution of an MFCC feature modeled through a GMM
with a small number of components, the means of the GMM reflect the most likely
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values of the MFCC feature.
Figure 4.1: 12 MFCC features each modeled using 256 GMM components with each
color representing one of 138 people.
Figure 4.2: 12 MFCC features each modeled using 4 GMM components with each
color representing one of 138 people.
With a lower number of components in the GMM model the training algorithm
has little room to work in. Therefore, it becomes likely that the means of the
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Gaussians will capture the likely values of the MFCC features. Figures 4.1 and
4.2 show the distribution for 12 MFCC components of 138 different people. Figure
4.1 uses 256 component GMM and Figure 4.2 uses 4 component GMM. It should
be clear that the general shape and peaks of the distributions are preserved even
when using as little as 4 components in the GMM. Simply using the means of the 4
component GMM gives a pretty accurate reflection of the peaks in the more accurate
256 component GMM.
Another observation concerning Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is the range of the features.
The MFCC features do not span a large range of values which means that there will
be many overlaps between the people’s voice features even in a group of 138 people.
Different people will have different feature distributions but with a significant overlap
with other people. This is indicative of the limited amount of entropy that can be
extracted from the MFCC features. This should make it clear that the means in
one person’s GMM will with a good probability fall into another person’s MFCC
distribution. This is exactly the point of weakness that our attack targets.
In general the goal of a MFCC based speaker verification system is to to test
whether a given set of MFCC features belong to a specific person or not. When
considering full distributions of a MFCC components belonging to two different
people an overlap will occur but that will not be sufficient to create a misidentifica-
tion. The nature of the Gaussian’s in the GMM spread the probability on the range
so that although an overlap exists it will preserve the uniqueness of every person.
However, due to the observations we made earlier the means in a GMM capturing
one person’s features will with good probability be close to the means of a different
GMM capturing the features of another person. This is where the system can be
manipulated.
If a person’s feature distribution is replaced with an impulse function represent-
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ing one of the means in their feature GMM, then we can expect the system to pass
that person as someone else with a good probability. Since the means of the GMM
are close to other people’s feature distribution peaks, and since we are using an im-
pulse function to place all the concentration of the distribution on these means we
will likely be a able to stimulate a misidentification. In the next section we explain
this attack in more detail.
4.4 The Attack
A successful attack signal needs to pass the speaker verification and the speech
recognition processes. To produce such a signal we create two attack signals each
of which targets one of these two modules. These two attack signals will be merged
later on in order to produce the final attack signal which we will refer to as the
hybrid signal.
The first attack signal will target the speech recognition module. Creating this
signal will amount to speech synthesis and therefore will be straightforward. The
attacker may simply use his/her own voice to speak the challenge words provided for
verification. As we discussed earlier, these signals are used to ensure the freshness
of the audio signal that is fed to the system. We refer to this signal as S1.
The second attack signal requires the creation of the MFCC impulse functions
that we discussed in the previous section. More specifically, the attacker analyzes a
large amount of his voice signals and then transforms them into a number of MFCC
features. The attacker can then model his features using a few component GMM
(in our attack we use 9-component GMM). The attacker’s GMM will contain a
number of means (in our case 9). Now the attacker will create a sound signal which
corresponds to an impulse function centered at one of the GMM means by inverting
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the GMM model for MFCC features [34]. The impulse function will correspond to
a voice signal where every time frame gives rise to the same exact MFCC value
(the value of the chosen mean). This means that the attacker will have several
candidates for the second attack signal one corresponding to every mean in the
GMM. We refer to these signals as si2 where i ∈ [1, . . . , n] where n represents the
number of components in the GMM model.
In the last step of the attack we merge the two attack signals to create the final
hybrid signal. There are a number of ways to merge these two signals. Our results
show that the most successful method is a simple concatenation. This means that
the hybrid signal will consist of the first attack signal followed immediately with the
second attack signal. There is a degree of freedom here, i.e. the duration of the two
signals relative to each other. In the next section we will show that the best results
where achieved when the second attack signal was several times the size of the first
attack signal. We refer to the hybrid signal as Hi = [S1|S
i
2].
Note that the first attack signal needs to be computed in real time due to the
challenge. However, the second attack signal can be precomputed. So when attack-
ing a live system the attacker proceeds as outlined in Table 4.1.
4.5 Experimental Results
Our experiments utilize the YOHO database which contains voice samples collected
from 138 different speakers with a sampling frequency of 8 kHz [40]. Each speaker’s
voice is recorded reciting a random combination of three two digit numbers. For
each speaker, YOHO has 4 enrollment sessions and 10 test sessions. Each enrollment
session contains 24 phrases (which are roughly equivalent to 3 of minute speech)
while each test session contains 4 phases (which are roughly equivalent to 20 second
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Table 4.1: Steps of the proposed voice password impersonation attack.
Impersonation Attack:
1. The system will ask the attacker to say a
certain word.
2. The attacker creates the S1 signal that
corresponds to him saying the given word.
3. Let i = 1:
4. The attacker feeds the authorization system the
signal Hi. If the system accepts the
voice signal then the attack has succeeded.
If i = n then the attack has failed.
5. Otherwise, i = i+ 1.
6. Go back to Step 4.
speech).
We start by explaining our setup for the voice authentication system that we
will be attacking.
4.5.1 Voice Authentication Setup
As explained in the previous section, our voice authentication system is composed
of two parallel sub-modules, i.e. speech recognition and speaker verification. Speech
recognition will be concerned with the actual speech spoken by the user. For this
module we decided to use a standard library for speech recognition. This is why
we used the Windows .NET Framework [52]. We treated the speech recognition
module as a black box that takes in a voice signal and returns the written form of
the speech input.
In the speaker verification, the voice signal is first broken into a number of
overlapped 10 ms frames. Each frame goes through a hamming window length
32 ms. Then for each frame a 26 dimensional MFCC is calculated. The first 13
feature except Zero’th dimension are kept as the MFCC features. Note that first
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and second derivatives of MFCC are sometimes concatenated to the last dimen-
sion of MFCC feature in order to increase entropy. However, experiments in [47]
have shown that dynamic (derivative) features contribute far less to the speaker
verification performance than normal features do. Furthermore, research in [50]
have shown that adding derivatives of MFCC contributes very little to the overall
identification performance. Therefore, our speaker verification module includes only
standard MFCC features. Next, based on the 13 dimensional MFCC features, a 256
components adapted GMM is trained following [3]:
1. A 256 component universal background model λb is trained
2. Each person’s GMM λi is trained by adapting only the mean vector of λb
where i refers to the ith person.
The verification process proceeds as follows. Given a sound signal from a person
x, the MFCC components are extracted and passed through a decision function D,
where
Dj(MFCCx) = log
(
p(MFCCx|λj)
p(MFCCx|λb)
)
. (4.1)
Given a threshold T , if Dj(MFCCx) > T the voice originating from x is passed as
the person j, otherwise the authorization fails. We set the threshold T = 0.1 such
that it yields a false positive rate of 0.48% and false negative rate of 3.1% 1
Note that the voice signal will pass the voice authentication if and only if it
passes both the speech and the speaker verification modules.
1For the equal error rate (where the false positive equals the false negative) our data happens
to be at 1.21%.
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4.5.2 Hybrid Signal Setup
Now we introduce our hybrid signal setup. Remember that the hybrid signal refers
to the signal that is used to mimic the voice of any target person. In our setup we
randomly chose one ID out of the 138 speakers that are in our data set, and denote
this person as x. Clearly, an attacker has access to his own voice. Therefore he
will always have the ability to build MFCCx(W ) representing any pass-phrase W .
Since the attacker does not know the background model 2, his own GMM is simply
trained by the K-mean method without background adaptation. Let us denote the
mean vector of his own GMM as mx(i) where i = 1 . . . n is the index of the mean
vector of the GMM.
To build up hybrid signal the attacker takes the following three steps:
1. Pick up one of mx(i),
2. Append a block of repetition of mx(i) to the last frame of MFCCx,
3. Invert the MFCC signal to synthesize the corresponding voice signal Hi.
The hybrid signal will compose of a noisy pass-phrase recited by the attacker followed
by a block of mock signal built up frommx(i). Note that the mock signal will appear
as noise to the naked eye. The first part is used to pass the speech verification process
while the second part is used to pass the speaker verification step.
4.5.3 Empirical Results
Two parameter values are decided in building the hybrid signals: the block length of
the repetition of mx(i) denoted as q and the number of components in the attacker’s
GMM denoted as n. The q parameter represents the ratio of the mock signal Si2
2The attacker can build a background model from a separate dataset that he constructs. Here
we just assume that he does not know the background.
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Table 4.2: Success rate of Attacking with different parameters. Assume speech
signal S1 is with a ratio of 1.
% of passing people
# of GMM (n)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
m
o
ck
si
gn
al
ra
ti
o
(q
) 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.41 6.62 6.62 6.62 5.88 5.88
2 0.00 0.74 0.74 9.56 25.74 29.41 32.35 39.71 52.94 55.15
3 0.00 1.47 11.76 26.47 40.44 45.59 52.21 59.56 55.15 55.15
4 0.00 4.41 19.12 41.18 47.79 60.29 63.97 72.79 74.26 77.94
5 0.00 8.09 29.41 55.15 56.62 70.59 72.06 80.88 88.24 90.44
6 0.00 5.88 34.56 58.82 64.71 75.74 77.94 90.44 93.38 94.12
7 2.21 11.03 45.59 62.50 71.32 77.94 82.35 91.91 94.12 95.59
8 1.47 12.50 43.38 62.50 70.59 80.15 86.76 92.65 98.53 97.79
to the speech signal S1. The larger the q parameter is, the more dominant the
mock signal part is. From an authentication protocol perspective, the parameter n
determines the max number of trials the attacker is allowed to make before triggering
an authentication failure.
In our experiments, we applied different ratios of the mock signals. We varied q
from 1 to 8. Meanwhile we varied the n parameter from 1 to 10. There were a total
of 137 victims that the attacker can try and impersonate. For this, given a fixed q,
for each victim the attacker tries n times, each time with a different hybrid signal
Hi. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the attack. For select q values these results
are also plotted in Figure 4.3.
The results clearly demonstrate that the attacker can certainly impersonate other
people in the database with a high success rate if the attack parameters are chosen
carefully. At first glance it is clear that with 9 GMMs an attacker can almost
certainly impersonate anyone in the database (98.5% success rate). The problem of
course is that a real system might not allow as many as n = 9 trials. Even under
such a restriction the 4 GMM scenario can produce pretty impressive results at 62%
success rate. These results strongly demonstrate a sever limitation in the intrinsic
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Figure 4.3: Attack success rate for select q values.
security of voice password authentication systems.
4.5.4 Limitations and Possible Improvements
In the previous sections we have outlined an attack targeting a sanitized voice pass-
word authentication system, and shared some experimental results showing the effi-
cacy of the proposed attack. Before we draw the conclusions we would like to point
out a number of limitations of the attack and briefly discuss possible improvements:
1. Our system carries out the speech recognition and speaker verification steps
in parallel (Assumption 1). If the speech recognition module is applied first to
the signal it might impose certain filters on speech signal thus eliminating the
second part of the speech signal. Such a procedure would prevent our attack.
This is in part due to the straightforward concatenation between the speech
signal and the added MFCC signals. More involved steps of signal mixing can
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be explored in order to strengthen our attack.
2. These results apply to a particular voice authentication system that uses stan-
dard MFCC features followed by GMM modeling (Assumption 2). While this
particular setting is commonly used in practice, the specifics vary from one
implementation to another. Specifically, we do not include derivative features
into our assumed system. Hence the success rate when applied to an actual
product will vary as well. Further work is required to assess the vulnerability,
and the precise success rate for actual products in the market.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we demonstrated an attack on basic voice authentication systems. We
demonstrated how one member of a voice database can manipulate his voice in order
to attack the other voice password accounts in the system. We demonstrated our
attack using the YOHO database which contains 138 people, and we showed how an
attacker can impersonate anyone in the database with a 62% success probability after
at most four authorization attempts. The attack reaches a 98% success probability
if up to nine authorization attempts are permitted. Our approach presents the first
steps towards attacking real-world voice authentication systems.
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Chapter 5
Attack on a Third-party Voice
Authentication System
In this chapter, we demonstrate an attack on a third-party open-source text-independent
voice authentication system. We first introduce our target system: ALIZE voice au-
thentication system in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5, we discuss the attack
rationale and propose how the mock speech signal can be built. This is followed by
Section 5.6 where we show experimental results of the application of our attack to
the YOHO database.
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5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we mount an effective attack on a third-party open-source text-
independent voice authentication system. Specifically, we show how an attacker
can simply use a signal generated at fixed frequency to pass voice authentication
and gain access to other user accounts. We demonstrate this attack on the ALIZE
voice authentication system using the YOHO voice database. We show through
experimentation that the attacker can impersonate any users in the database of
69 people with about 25% success rate with only 5 trials. The success rate can
achieve more than 50% by increasing the allowed authentication attempts to 20.
These success rates are significantly higher than the rates achievable by exploiting
the false positive rate of the voice authentication system using random trials. Note
that our attack in this chapter together with the attack in the previous chapter
do not assume the attacker has any knowledge of the victim’s voice. That is the
main difference between our attack and synthesized speech attack mentioned in
[15, 16, 17]. The experiments on YOHO database shows that the success rate of
impersonating users exploiting the attack methods matches the prediction given by
the theoretical entropy estimation. The theoretical entropy estimation together with
the fact that our attack takes effect indicate the entropy of human voice database is
limited. The limited entropy explains from information point of view, why speaker
verification system is vulnerable to spoofing attack.
5.2 Open Source Software
ALIZE is an open-source voice authentication system implementing the MFCC and
GMM based text-independent speaker verification algorithm [3]. It was originally
invented from University of Avignon [53, 54]. Later on as mentioned in [55] and [56]
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ALIZE became a baseline reference system under BioSecure Speaker Verification
Benchmarking Framework. Note that BioSecure Network of Excellence was founded
in 2004. More information can be found in [57] and their website [58]. The other
baseline reference system adopted by BioSecure is BECARS [56, 57]. The ALIZE
system can be downloaded from [59]. In this chapter we mount attack on ALIZE
system.
5.3 Attack Rationale
Our attack is based on the indication that human voice has low entropy (see Chap-
ter 3 for theoretical analysis). The speech feature of human voice concentrates in
a relatively small high dimensional space because of the low entropy. Therefore it
becomes possible to build a mock speech whose speech feature is similar to the fea-
ture of other users. The strategy of our attack is to synthesize a mock speech signal
that satisfies the speaker model generated from the speaker verification module.
To make our point, we briefly review the speaker verification process. In the
enrollment phase, a user’s voice is modeled as GMM over MFCC features. In the
verification phase, a newly collected voice sample is processed. The resulting MFCC
feature is placed into GMM, yielding a likelihood metric measurement. If that
measurement is greater than a given threshold, the new voice sample passes the
authentication, otherwise it fails. Note that in both phases the MFCC (and its
derivatives) is used to represent the feature of voice. Thus, later on in the context,
the word “speech feature” and the MFCC are interchangeable to each other and
both refer to the high dimensional vector containing MFCC (and its derivatives). To
simplify the concept, we can view the MFCC as orderless high dimensional random
variable (r.v.). We denote such a r.v. as C. The Gaussian Mixture Model captures
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the probability density function (pdf) of the r.v. C . We denote the Gaussian
Mixture Density function in Equation 2.2 as G(C), specifically
Gi(C) = p(C|λi) . (5.1)
Here Gi(C) denotes the Gaussian mixture density function defined with parmeter
λi.
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Figure 5.1: Demonstration of point-wise verification process of GMM based voice
authentication.
Now we discuss the rationale behind the attack. At first glance, the attacker
has to retrieve the whole distribution of a voice feature in order to impersonate
other users. However, we claim that this will not be necessary. We now explain
this by examining the verification process. Assume in the verification phase, the
system is judging whether or not a fresh MFCC is extracted from the user i who
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has previously enrolled GMM template Gi(C). The following two observations can
be made:
1. Based on Equation 2.3 Equation 2.4 the overall likelihood score measures the
geometric mean of point-wise “distance” from each of the MFCC points to the
template GMM Gi(C). A successful verification can be expected for sure in
case that each point-wise measurement yields a likelihood greater than T (the
given threshold in Equation 2.4).
2. For the point-wise measurement, i.e. consider only a single point of MFCC
in each measurement, the possible value of MFCC to pass the verification is
not determined by the entire distribution Gi(C), but a range Si of C, where
the corresponding probability Gi(C) is greater than the threshold T . In other
words, any value within range Si would lead to a successful point-wise verifi-
cation (see demonstration in Figure 5.1). Furthermore, based on Observation
1, any collection from Si can be used as voice feature to pass the verification
as the user i.
The above observations indicate that the attacker could impersonate the user i by
picking up mock speech feature from any value in the range of Si. We formalize the
attack rationale to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In GMM based speaker verification [3], given a threshold T and a
speaker model GMM Gi(C) capturing the distribution of i
th user’s voice feature, we
define the passing set of the user i as Si = {c : Gi(c) > T}. If the attacker can find
any subset ca ⊂ Si, the attacker can impersonate the user i using the voice feature
built from ca.
Proof. Assume in the feature domain, ca is known. Then an n-frame mock voice
feature M can be built up. Here M = {c1, c2, . . . , cn} where ci ∈ ca for all i and n
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is an arbitrary positive integer number. Since ca ⊂ Si = {c : Gi(c) > T} we have
Gi(ck) > T for all k. Furthermore, from Equation 2.3 and Equation 5.1 we derive
that q(M |λi) = (
∏n
k=1Gi(ck))
1
n > T . According to Equation 2.4, the mock voice
feature M will pass the authentication as the user i.
Now we demonstrate a visualized explanation for Proposition 4 with Figure
5.1. On this one dimensional example, the model of voice feature (the MFCC) is
the probability density function (the black dash curve) built up by 4 equal weight
Gaussians (the colorful solid curves). Assuming the threshold is T, in case that the
voice feature contains only one point and the feature point falls within the range of
Si, such voice feature will definitely lead to a successful verification. In case that
the voice feature contains more than one points and all the feature points fall within
the range of Si, such voice feature will also for sure pass the verification.
Proposition 4 simplifies the attack from acquiring an entire distribution Gi(C) of
a voice feature to searching for a few points ca. Note that this proposition applies to
both GMM and GMM-UBM systems. In case of GMM-UBM system, the Equation
5.1 is substitute by
Gi(C) =
p(C|λi)
p(C|λb)
where λb is the universal background model. Again, due to the low entropy of human
voice, ca should not be hard to find. To synthesize a mock speech signal, we can go
from two directions: either find ca first and invert it back to time domain, due to the
invertible property of MFCC (see Section 2.2.4), or build a time domain signal that
yields ca. In the following sections we will discuss how to generate attack signals in
detail.
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5.4 Review of an Earlier Attack
In this section, we briefly review the attack introduced in [51] which defines a voice
authentication systems following the GMM based speaker verification technology
specified in [3]. The attack works by building a mock MFCC and then inverting it
back to time domain. The attack assumes that the attacker has access to his/her
own speech samples and therefore can produce the GMM from his/her own speech
feature. Next, a mock MFCC is built by repeating one of the means extracted
from the attacker’s GMM. Finally, the mock speech signal is generated by inverting
the mock MFCC signal back to time domain. Note that each of the means of the
GMM is considered as a candidate point of ca. Thus with an N component GMM,
the attacker would have up to N candidate mock speech signals, i.e. the attacker
may try the authenticate up to N times. The experiments in [51] showed that the
attacker can impersonate more than half of the voice in the target database with
N = 4 and can impersonate almost everyone with N = 9.
A possible reason why the mean of the GMM can be good candidates of ca
is because of the low entropy of voice. The same reference, i.e. [51], provides the
following explanation: Given a probability distribution of an MFCC feature modeled
through a GMM with a small number of components, the means of the GMM reflect
the most likely values of the MFCC feature. The claim is based on two observations
in [51]:
1. MFCC features of different people are similar to each other and therefore
highly overlapped.
2. Even with only a few components the GMM captures the general shape of a
MFCC distribution.
However, this attack does not apply to ALIZE authentication system, due to an
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additional normalization step in MFCC processing.
5.5 Attack Method Targeting ALIZE: From Time
Domain Signal to MFCC
In this section we propose a successful attack method targeting the ALIZE authen-
tication system. We start from examining what prevents the previous method in
Section 5.4 from working on the ALIZE. In the ALIZE the MFCC processing step
is implemented exactly in the same way as we described in Section 2.2.4 except
that there are two more additional steps: energy detection and normalization. The
energy detection is used for silence removal. The bottom N% of low energy frames
is considered as background noise and therefore removed. The normalization deals
with the environmental mismatch 1. Given the MFCC feature c ∈ C, the normal-
ization step is processed by
cn =
c−E(c)
V ar(c)
. (5.2)
Where the E(c) and V ar(c) are mean and variance of the original MFCC. The
normalized MFCC will have zero means and one variance for each dimension.
These two new steps compared with the system in [51] change the value of desired
mock MFCC and therefore cause the failure of applying attack method in Section
2.2.4 to ALIZE. Especially, the normalization step treats the constant-like mock
MFCC 2 as DC offset and reset the mock MFCC back to zero. The normalization
step makes it harder to convert MFCC back to time signal.
Instead of finding a de-normalization step, we present an alternative way of
1Note that normalization may not be the necessary step in case of clean environment databases
such as YOHO database the one we used in the experiment.
2Remember the mock MFCC is a repetition of a means of a GMM in [51]
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building the attack signal. That is we explore time domain signals which have decent
probability yielding a mock MFCC ∈ ca. Remember in [51], the mock MFCC was
generated by the repetition of mean of Gaussians. The reason the authors did this
was because they wanted a MFCC feature with repetition of a simple pattern which
contains as few different values as possible so as to increase the chance of hitting
the set Si (see Proposition 4 for detail). Similarly, we want our time domain mock
speech signal maps to a simple MFCC pattern. Based on this criteria, sine wave
may be a good candidate. Since it maps to an impulse function in frequency domain
the sine wave leads to a simple pattern in MFCC domain. To deal with the energy
detection we apply Gaussian modulation to the pure sine wave. Finally, our mock
speech signal appears to be a Gaussian modulated sine wave with a form
y(t) = cos(2pifct)e
− t
2
τ2 . (5.3)
Here fc corresponds to the frequency of sine wave, and τ determines the width of
the pulse in time domain. The possible frequencies for fc in the pulse ranges from
0 to fs
2
where the fs is the sample frequency. For each mock speech, the frequency
is fixed. This mock speech signal overcomes the normalization problem in ALIZE
software. In the next session we will demonstrate the performance of the attack.
5.6 Experimental Results
We now demonstrate our experimental results. We start by discussing target system
selection and the voice database selection. Then, we describe the parameter setup
for both the target system and the mock speech signal. Next, we show the attack
performance. Finally, we conclude this section with discussions.
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5.6.1 Target System Selection – Why ALIZE
An ideal target system should be a well known commercial voice authentication
system. However, the detail implementation of such commercial system can not
be found easily. Instead, we found ALIZE. The reasons why we choose ALIZE
are as following: first, it is an open-source software. We can know exactly how
each step works inside the system. Second, it is quality guaranteed and thoroughly
tested. Related to which, many research papers have been published. Third, it is
well documented. Besides research publications, AIZE has user guide which can be
downloaded along with the software. More detail of ALIZE can be found in Section
5.2.
5.6.2 Database Selection
Our experiments utilize the YOHO database which contains voice samples collected
from 138 different speakers with a sampling frequency of 8 kHz [40]. Each speaker’s
voice is recorded reciting a random combination of three two digit numbers. For
each speaker, YOHO has 4 enrollment sessions and 10 test sessions. Each enrollment
session contains 24 phrases (which are roughly equivalent to 3 of minute speech)
while each test session contains 4 phrases (which are roughly equivalent to 20 second
speech).
Note that in the provided document in [59], ALIZE is evaluated under database
BANCA and NIST 2005. We did not use these two databases because both of these
two databases are unconstraint speeches yielding high Equal Error Rates (EER)
around 10% which in turn gives high false positive rates. Such an high equal error
rate itself gives too much advantages to the attacker. Thus, instead, we use another
NIST database YOHO which constrains the speech content to digital numbers. Such
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that it is more robust and secure. We keep the parameter selection in most case
in the same way as the selections targeting NIST 2005 in [59], unless there were
necessary changes.
5.6.3 ALIZE Setup
We now describe the parameter setup for ALIZE system with YOHO database. In
ALIZE, the voice signal is first broken into a number of overlapped 10 ms frames.
Each frame goes through a hamming window length 20 ms. Then for each frame a
24 dimensional MFCC is calculated. The first 16 feature except Zero’th dimension
as long as their first derivatives are kept as the MFCC features. Note that the
signal energy and derivatives of the energy are also appended to the feature. The
final voice feature contains totally 34 dimensions (16 MFCC, 16 delta MFCC, 1
energy and 1 delta energy). The energy detection step follows this step. Based the
energy dimension, the frames are classified to two clusters. The cluster corresponds
to the high energy is kept as speech frames while the cluster corresponds to the low
energy is discarded. Note that after this step the energy dimension is discarded, i.e.
the voice feature contains only 33 dimensions in the training and the verification
session. Next, the speech frames is normalized by Equation 5.2. After that, a 512
components adapted GMM is trained following [3]:
1. A 512 component universal background model λb is trained
2. Each user’s GMM λi is trained by adapting only the mean vector of λb where
i refers to the ith user.
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The verification process proceeds as follows. Given a sound signal from a user x, the
MFCC components are extracted and passed through a decision function D, where
Dj(MFCCx) = log
(
p(MFCCx|λj)
p(MFCCx|λb)
)
. (5.4)
Given a threshold T , if Dj(MFCCx) > T the voice originating from x is passed as
the user j, otherwise the authorization fails.
We set the threshold T = 0.5 such that it yields a false positive rate of 0.44%
and false negative rate of 1.56%. 3
5.6.4 Mock Signal Setup
The mock speech signal is built up from fixed frequency Gaussian-modulated sinu-
soidal pulse which is given by
y(t) = cos(2pifct)e
−
c0t
2
(bwfc)
2 . (5.5)
Here, c0 > 0 is a constant, fc is the center frequency and bw is the fractional band-
width. The center frequency fc varies from 1 to 4000 Hz. We select the fractional
bandwidth as bw =
200
fc
such that all pulses will have same time length and one
pulse takes effect within 20 ms which equals to the length of windowed frame in the
ALIZE setup. We repeatedly generate the pulse every 100 ms, such that pulses do
not interfere with each other during the windowing process. Figure 5.2 and Figure
5.3 show a typical waveform of mock signal in time domain.
3For the equal error rate (where the false positive equals the false negative) our data happens
to be at 0.94%.
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Figure 5.2: Example of mock speech.
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Figure 5.3: Example of mock speech (zooming in one pulse).
5.6.5 Empirical Results
Due to the existence of the false positive rate of the system, one may pass the
authentication as someone else with small probability. With huge amount of trials
of different voice samples collected from random users, the attacker will eventually
successfully impersonate a designated user and get access to his account. The success
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rate of this naive brute-force attack is given by
Sr = 1− (1− fn)
N (5.6)
depending on false positive rate fn and number of trials N . We name such an
naive attack as random test. Note that in our system setup the fn is 0.44%. We
will show in the following experiments our attack scheme performs overwhelmingly
better than the random test.
We now test the success impersonation rate of all mock speech signals with the
center frequencies ranging from 1 to 4000 Hz. As shown in Figure 5.4, in most cases
of all 4000 frequencies, our mock signals achieve higher success rate than random
test. Figure 5.5 shows the number of times that each speaker in the database is
impersonated by the mock speech signals. We can also see from Figure 5.5 that
in case of 97 speaker IDs out of 138, our mock signals pass the verification more
times than random test. Based on Figure 5.5, 89.9% of the users in the database
can be impersonated at least once after trials of all 4000 frequencies. Meanwhile, on
average the mock signal succeeded 110 times out of 4000 trials which is equivalent
to 2.76% success rate with one trial. The 2.76% success rate outperforms the rate
of random test which equals 0.44% with one trial. The experiment so far indicates
that our mock speech signals built from 4000 various Hz perform in overall better
than random test. However with 4000 trials, the random test itself can almost get
access to any designated account. The coming up question is if we reduce number
of trials, i.e. building less mock signals, can our attack scheme still achieve a better
success rate than random test does?
To answer the question above, we next show that with a few number of trials
our attack will still successfully get access to a decent number of accounts. To do
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this we need obtain some pre-knowledge that which frequencies are statistically more
likely to pass the verification. Such a job will be easy, if Figure 5.4 is given to the
attacker in advance. For instance, we can see from Figure 5.4 that some frequencies
around 2300 Hz have more than 10% of chance to mimic the users’ voice in the
database. Meanwhile, frequencies around 500 Hz, 1150 Hz and 3400 Hz also have
decent probability to impersonate users in the database. Knowing this, we would
start to try our luck with the mock signal built from 2300 Hz. Then we would try
500 Hz, 1150 Hz and 3400 Hz consequentially, so on and so forth. Although in the
reality, the attacker is not allowed to get access to the voice database of the target
system, he can collect his own database and obtaining the “pre-knowledge” from
his own database.
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Figure 5.4: Success rate of impersonating users using fixed frequencies ranging from
1 to 4000 Hz on YOHO database with 138 users.
In the next experiment, we assume the attacker has his own voice database4.
4Note that since human voice is relatively easy to collect, it’s reasonable to make such an
assumption
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Figure 5.5: Number of times that each speaker is impersonated by mock speech
signals testing on YOHO database with 138 people.
The attacker then can better select candidate signal out of 4000 frequencies with
the help of his own database. We name this attack as selected frequency attack.
To simulate this, we divide the YOHO database into two equal size subsets DB1
and DB2, each containing 69 speakers. We assume DB1 belong to the attackers
and used for training the “pre-knowledge” while DB2 acts as database of the target
system. To get the “pre-knowledge”, we build up a matrixMp based on the database
DB1. Here in Mp, the row indexes the speaker ID in DB1; the column indexes the
frequencies of the mock speech signals (i.e. the ID of mock speech signal). In the
attacker’s training process, we set Mp(i, j) = 1 whenever the mock speech built
from jth frequency successfully impersonate the ith user in DB1. Note that the
matrix Mp reflect statistically which frequencies are more likely to mimic the users’
voice in the database. We then mount the attack to the ALIZE system which uses
database DB2. Having the “pre-knowledge” matrix Mp, we select candidate signals
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Impersonation Attack using selected frequencies:
1. Select jˆth mock speech signal such
that jˆ = arg(maxj(
∑
iMp(i, j))).
2. Find all iˆ such that Mp(ˆi, jˆ) = 1. Then
set Mp(ˆi, j) = 0 for all j,
set Mp(i, jˆ) = 0 for all i.
3. Go back to step 1 unless Mp(i, j) = 0 for all i and j.
Figure 5.6: Steps of selecting mock speech signal based on Mp.
using the algorithm as shown in Figure 5.6. We then repeat the same experiment
by exchanging the roles of DB1 and DB2, i.e. DB2 acts as the attacker’s database
while DB1 becomes ALIZE’s database in the second experiment.
Figure 5.7 gives the success rate of the attack versus number of trials the attacker
attempts. As we can see in Figure 5.7, using our attack method, around 25% of the
accounts are compromised within 5 trials compared to 2.18% success rate through
random test with same amount of trials. If the number of allowed trials is rised up
to 20, more than 50% of the accounts are compromised while the random test can
only impersonate 8.44% of users with 20 trials.
5.6.6 Discussions
Now we relate the result in this chapter to the entropy estimation in Chapter 3 and
the simulated attack in Chapter 4. We see certain performance degradation from
Table 4.2 to Figure 5.7, explained as follows:
1. ALIZE uses 34 dimensions of voice features (including delta MFCC), while
assumed authentication in Chapter 4 uses 12 dimensions of voice feature. The
increasing of dimensions adds up entropy. However, as explained in [51], delta
MFCC will not add too much entropy since they are highly dependent of
MFCC. That explains why we need more trials to mount a successful attack
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Figure 5.7: Selected frequency attack assuming the attacker makes usage of his own
voice database.
to ALIZE while the number of trials does not increase tremendously compared
with [51].
2. ALIZE applying normalization to voice feature in a way that makes it hard
to build mock signal from MFCC domain (see details in Section 5.5). Alter-
natively, we propose a possible attack that builds signals from time domain
using various fixed frequencies.
3. The proposed attack in this chapter may not be the optimized one. Different
from the means of GMM which are good representation of ca in MFCC domain
due to the similarity of GMMs, there is no direct connection from the frequency
73
signal to ca. Each specific frequency signal in time domain forms a unique
pattern in MFCC domain. We search blindly among frequencies to find a
pattern that coincidentally matches to some points in ca.
The fact that we can still find such a match with only a few trials is an empirical
confirmation of the analysis in Chapter 3 that the entropy of human voice is low.
As shown in Figure 5.7 the attack signal can impersonate about 25% of users with
only 5 trials. As the number of allowed trials is increased to 20, the impersonation
rate can achieve more than 50% success. The attack is significantly more effective
than random test which yields success rates of 2.18% and 8.44% with 5 and 20 trials,
respectively.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we demonstrated an attack on the ALIZE voice authentication sys-
tems. We showed how an attacker can use fixed frequency stimulus to build mock
speech signals which can pass the voice authentication with a limited number of
trials. We demonstrated the attack on ALIZE voice authentication system using
the YOHO database. The attack achieves more than 50% success rate of imper-
sonating any users in the database after at most 20 authentication attempts. The
attack can still succeed with about 25% success rate if only 5 attempts are allowed.
The comparison of success rate between the attack and the random test shows the
effectiveness of our attack.
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Chapter 6
Further Discussion
6.1 How Does Our Work Relate to State-Of-the-
Art Systems?
Since the introduction of GMM-UBM more than a decade ago, many new techniques
have appeared in the literature gaining popularity over GMM-UBM. Joint Factor
Analysis (JFA) [60, 6, 7] and I-Vector [9] are representatives of state-of-the-art text-
independent speaker verification systems. However, these systems are still tightly
related to GMM-UBM.
Joint Factor Analysis (JFA) [8] is an extension of GMM. The JFA models inter-
session variability which is mainly contributed by channel variability and intra-
speaker variability. Whereas GMM-UBM only models the intra-speaker variability.
Suppose F represents the number of dimensions of voice features, e.g. MFCC and
N stands for the number of Gaussian components in a universal background model.
The JFA model defines a super-vector M with dimension of F ×N by concatenating
the F dimensional mean vectors in the GMM of a given speech. The super-vector
M is the composition of the UBM mean vector m, speaker factors vy+ dz and the
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channel factor ux
M =m+ vy + dz + ux . (6.1)
JFA can be viewed a less noisy version of GMM-UBM. If we set u = 0, the
super-vector M is very close to the adapted GMM of a speaker. From the entropy
point of view, since GMM-UBM is more noisy (i.e. the adapted GMM counts the
channel variability into speaker variability), the entropy estimation result on GMM-
UBM should be higher than JFA, therefore, the estimation on GMM-UBM will
yield an entropy upper-bound. Furthermore, the scoring process of JFA is similar
to GMM-UBM. The likelihood scoring method used by GMM-UBM can be directly
applied to JFA [61, 62]. In this sense, the attack rationale in our dissertation also
applies to the JFA based system. Moreover, it may not be necessary to use JFA in
our experiment setup. The overall performance of JFA is better than GMM-UBM
because JFA compensates channel variability. However, in case that all speakers’
voice samples are recorded by the same device in a clean environment, as in the case
of the YOHO database that we are using, JFA will have no significant advantage
over GMM-UBM as the term u is close to 0.
The I-Vector [39] is based on JFA. Similar to JFA the I-Vector represents the
super-vector M as
M =m+Tw , (6.2)
where T is the total variability matrix with low rank and w is a random vector,
i.e. the I-Vector characterizing the inter-speaker variability. The angle between
pre-enrolled I-Vector and target I-vector represents the similarity score. Since there
are no channel related terms, extra channel compensation steps are needed before
scoring. Popular compensation methods include WCCN, LDA plus WCCN [9].
The I-Vector extracts more compressed information from GMM. A simple mod-
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ification on the attack rationale in Section 5.3 can make it fit to the case of the
I-Vector. Instead of using Proposition 4, the attacker needs to find a signal repre-
sentation leading to a I-Vector who has an angle within the range of θ − δ to θ + δ
where θ is the angle of the pre-enrolled I-Vector belonging to a victim. The δ is the
threshold to determine whether or not the verification will succeed. If the entropy
of voice is low, such a signal representation will be easy to find.
From GMM to JFA to I-Vector, the voice characters become more precise and
more compact. However, our work shows from both theoretical and practical views
that the entropy of the Voice Password Databases is limited. The limited entropy
which enables our attack on GMM-UBM is an intrinsic property of the speech signal
still present even if JFA or an I-Vector based system is employed. The experiments
in [39] complement our attack. As seen in Table 2 of [39] the 2 second short utterance
in testing yields an incredibly high equal error rate no matter how long the training
sessions are. This experiment can also be viewed as an “attack” to the speaker
verification system. The attack signal is the 2 second short utterance. This results
in [39] shows JFA and I-Vector based systems are also vulnerable to an attack similar
to the one presented in this dissertation due to the limited entropy of human voice.
6.2 Utilization of Voice Passwords
The experiment of entropy estimation in Chapter 3 and the attacks in Chapter
4 and 5 are indications that the entropy of the text-independent human voice is
limited. One needs to be very careful when they want to use the human voice for
the authentication task.
The experiments in Chapter 3 show that the entropy of voice feature extracted
from the YOHO database containing 138 users is less than 14 bits. The 14 bits is the
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amount of entropy that a 4-digits number password can provide. Voice passwords
can be applied to the place where a weak password is acceptable. For example, the
voice passwords can be a substitution of 4 digits lock code on Iphones.
The strength of the text-independent voice password can be reinforced by tak-
ing into consideration the content of the speech i.e. using text-dependent voice
authentication. In such case, in the enrollment phase, the user has to remember
a passphrase and record his passphrase along with his voice. In the verification
phase, the user needs to recite the same passphrase. If and only if the voice and
the passphrase both match, the user can pass the authentication. We now estimate
the entropy of such a text-dependent voice password. Assume the entropy provided
by the text-independent voice is nv bits and the length of the passphrase is c. Each
character of the passphrase composes of letter a to z and digit 0 to 9. As a result
the entropy that the password can provide is c log2 36. The total entropy of such a
text-dependent password is nv + c log2 36 bits. Assuming the nv = 14 and c = 4,
the entropy of such voice password is about 34 bits. A higher entropy bits can
be reached by using longer passphrase. Similarly, instead of using passphrase, we
may combine other biometric sources with voice. The security level of such a fusion
system will be strengthened. The total entropy of such a fusion system is
∑N
i=1 ni
where the N is the number of biometric sources and ni is the entropy of the i
th
source.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
In this dissertation, we estimated the security level of voice password databases. We
reviewed an authentication model i.e. the MFCC and GMM based authentication
model that captures what is nowadays used in many voice password products. Next,
we developed a theoretical framework based on the notion of relative entropy in or-
der to estimate the entropy of a voice database. Using the relative entropy estimates
we were able to estimate the security level offered by a voice authentication system
relying on a voice database. In order to verify our security estimates, we carried
out a number of experiments using the YOHO voice database. We showed with
experiments that the number of entropy which can be extracted from the YOHO
database which contains 138 speakers is no more than 14 bits. To confirm our the-
oretical entropy estimation, we propose an attack on the MFCC and GMM based
basic voice authentication systems. We demonstrated our attack using the YOHO
database and showed how an attacker can impersonate anyone in the database with
a 62% success probability after at most four authorization attempts. The attack
reaches a 98% success probability if up to nine authorization attempts are permit-
ted. Furthermore, we demonstrated an attack on a third-party system, the ALIZE
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voice authentication systems. We showed how an attacker may use fixed frequency
stimulus to build mock speech signals which passes the voice authentication with a
limited number of attempts. Again, we demonstrated the attack using the YOHO
database and showed the attack can achieve more than 50% success rate of im-
personating any users in the database after at most 20 authentication trials. The
attack can still maintain a success rate of about 25% if only 5 attempts are allowed.
The comparison of success rate between the attack and the random test shows the
effectiveness of our attack. With these, we take an initial step towards evaluating
voice password databases from a security perspective.
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